"If Saddam Hussein was an immediate and serious threat to America, as the White House claimed, then Bush might have been justified in invading Iraq. But it appears that Bush misled the public, the Congress and the UN by consistently overstating the threat from Iraq. By lying to Congress, Bush violated US Laws related to Fraud and False Statements."
Impeach Bush - Iraq Lies
1.
"A classified report, delivered to Bush in early January 2003, was a summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, focusing on whether Saddam would launch an unprovoked attack on the United States, either directly, or indirectly by working with terrorists. The report stated that U.S. intelligence agencies unanimously agreed that it was unlikely that Saddam would try to attack the United States."
"On at least four earlier occasions, beginning in the spring of 2002, according to the same records and sources, the president was informed during his morning intelligence briefing that U.S. intelligence agencies believed it was unlikely that Saddam was an imminent threat to the United States. However, in the months leading up to the war, Bush, Cheney, and Cabinet members repeatedly asserted that Saddam was likely to use chemical or biological weapons against the United States or to provide such weapons to Al Qaeda or another terrorist group. The Bush administration used the potential threat from Saddam as a major rationale in making the case to go to war. The president cited the threat in an address to the United Nations on September 12, 2002, in an October 7, 2002, speech to the American people, and in his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003."
NATIONAL JOURNAL: What Bush Was Told About Iraq (03/02/2006)
2.
"The CIA sent two memos to the White House in October voicing strong doubts about a claim President Bush made three months later in the State of the Union address that Iraq was trying to buy nuclear material in Africa. The CIA warned the White House early on that the charge, based on an allegation that Iraq sought 500 tons of uranium in Niger, relied on weak evidence, was not particularly significant and assumed Iraq was pursuing an acquisition that was arguably not possible and of questionable value because Iraq had its own supplies."
"Disclosures indicate top White House officials knew that the CIA seriously disputed the claim that Saddam Hussein was seeking uranium in Africa long before the claim was included in Bush's January address to the nation. The claim was a major part of the case made by the Bush administration before the Iraq war that Hussein represented a serious threat because of his nuclear ambitions."
washingtonpost72303
3.
"Eleven days before President Bush's January 28, 2003, State of the Union address in which he said that the US learned from British intelligence that Iraq had attempted to acquire uranium from Africa - an explosive claim that helped pave the way to war - the State Department told the CIA that the intelligence the uranium claims were based upon were forgeries."
State Dept. Exposed Niger Forgeries 11 Days Before Bush's 16 Words
4.
"The CIA had evidence Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction six months before the 2003 US-led invasion but was ignored by a White House intent on ousting Saddam Hussein."
Ex-CIA agent says WMD intelligence ignored - Boston.com
5.
"The German intelligence officials responsible for one of the most important informants on Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons of mass destruction say that the Bush administration and the CIA repeatedly exaggerated his claims during the run-up to the war in Iraq. According to the Germans, President Bush mischaracterized Curveball's information when he warned before the war that Iraq had at least seven mobile factories brewing biological poisons."
"The White House ignored evidence gathered by United Nations weapons inspectors shortly before the war that disproved Curveball's account. Bush and his aides issued increasingly dire warnings about Iraq's biological weapons before the war even though intelligence from Curveball had not changed in two years."
How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of 'Curveball'
PS.
Two volumes of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Phase II report comparing the Bush administration's public statements about Saddam Hussein with the evidence senior officials reviewed in private were released on September 8, 2006. The conclusions of these reports were that there was no prewar evidence that Saddam was building weapons of mass destruction and there was no evidence that Saddam had links to al-Qaeda.
Key Judgments of the Report Comparing Pre-War Intelligence to Post-war Findings:
-Iraq did not provide any material or operational support to al-Qa段da prior to the war.
-No evidence was found of any meeting between the Iraq regime and al-Qa段da before the war other than a single meeting that took place in 1995 in the Sudan, and that meeting did not lead to any operational support.
-Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa段da and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime. He refused all al-Qa段da requests and issued a general order that Iraq should not deal with al-Qa段da.
-The claim that Iraq provided al-Qa段da with training in chemical and biological weapons prior to the war was false and based on the reporting of a single source, al-Libi, whom the Defense Intelligence Agency warned as early as February 2002 was intentionally misleading his debriefers. The CIA concluded in February 2004 that al-Libi was a fabricator.
-Iraq was not aware of al-Zarqawi痴 presence in Baghdad in 2002 until alerted by a foreign government. Saddam Hussein viewed al-Zarqawi as an outlaw and attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture him. Al-Zarqawi left in November 2002 and did not return to Baghdad until after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.
-The Intelligence Community was correct that there was no connection to 9/11, no indication that Saddam Hussein intended to use al-Qa段da or any other terrorist group to strike the U.S.
http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf
ROCKEFELLER SAYS PARTIAL RELEASE OF PHASE II REPORTS PAINT CLEARER PICTURE OF MISTAKES MADE IN LEAD UP TO IRAQ WAR
Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



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