Thread: Stephen Hayes: Conservatives' Favorite Source Of The "Link" Between Iraq And Al Qaeda

Originally Posted by LC

I can list more than one hundred verified and proven connections between AQ and Saddams Iraq.....

congress knew of the connection through Douglas Feith who documented the contacts. His memo was reviewed by a panel of four intelligence experts chosen by democrats and republicans. Much of what was revealed was and is still top secret and thus isn't available to the supporters or detractors of the issue (nor to the NYT , since those parts of the report were not released) I could take hours typing out what is publically avilable in open sources , or you could just read "The Connection" by Steven Hayes who documents them all. By the way he has the credibility that the NYT has squandered.

Stephen Hayes is a columnist for The Weekly Standard (a right-wing magazine) and author of the book "The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America". Hayes is best known for his series of articles describing alleged links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda.

Despite vigorous critiques that have undermined the credibility of Hayes's claim, conservative pundits have embraced Hayes and his book in order to, in the words of Center for Strategic and International Studies fellow Daniel A. Benjamin, "shore up the rickety argument that Baathist Iraq had posed a real national security threat to the United States."

The first chapter of Hayes's book, as well as an entire Weekly Standard article by Hayes that is adapted from his book, tells the story of how Christopher Carney, deputy to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, discovered that the name (Ahmed Hikmat Shakir) of an airport greeter for Al Qaeda in Malaysia is the same as that of one of Saddam Hussein's Fedayeen personal militia officers. Hayes wrote, "The Shakir story is perhaps the government's strongest indication that Saddam and al Qaeda may have worked together on September 11." But Washington Post staff writers Walter Pincus and Dan Eggen reported that, according to a senior administration official, the story was most likely the result of "confusion over names":

Al Qaeda Link To Iraq May Be Confusion Over Names (washingtonpost.com)

Hayes's first extensive foray into the topic of "the connection" was a cover story in the November 24, 2003, issue of The Weekly Standard titled "Case Closed," which was based on the leak of a classified Defense Department intelligence written by Feith. The memo outlined numerous data points in support of the possible theory that Saddam Hussein had a working relationship with Al Qaeda. Hayes wrote:

"Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al Qaeda training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial support for al Qaeda--perhaps even for Mohamed Atta--according to a top secret U.S. government memorandum obtained by The Weekly Standard."

The Department of Defense subsequently issued a press release downplaying the memo's significance and undermining the conclusion reached by Hayes: "The classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaida, and it drew no conclusions."

DoD News: DoD Statement on News Reports of Al Qaeda and Iraq Connections

On November 18, 2003, The Washington Post's Pincus reported criticisms of Hayes's article and of the memo itself: W. Patrick Lang, former head of the Middle East section of the DIA said yesterday that the Standard article "is a listing of a mass of unconfirmed reports, many of which themselves indicate that the two groups continued to try to establish some sort of relationship. If they had such a productive relationship, why did they have to keep trying?"

CIA Seeks Probe of Iraq-Al Qaeda Memo Leak (washingtonpost.com)

Another former senior intelligence official said the memo is not an intelligence product but rather "data points among the millions of holdings of the intelligence agencies, many of which are simply not thought likely to be true."

The most vigorous critique of Hayes's article came from a November 19, 2003, Newsweek article titled "Case Decidedly Not Closed: The Defense Dept. memo allegedly proving a link between Al Qaeda and Saddam does nothing of the sort," in which Investigative Correspondents Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball wrote that Hayes's article was "mostly based on unverified claims that were first advanced by some top Bush administration officials more than a year ago -- and were largely discounted at the time by the U.S. intelligence community, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials."

Isikoff and Hosenball discredited the memo upon which Hayes based his argument:

"In fact, the tangled tale of the memo suggests that the case of whether there has been Iraqi-Al Qaeda complicity is far from closed... With a few, inconclusive exceptions, the memo doesn't actually contain much "new" intelligence at all. Instead, it mostly recycles shards of old, raw data that were first assembled last year by a tiny team of floating Pentagon analysts (led by a Pennsylvania State University professor and U.S. Navy analyst Christopher Carney) whom (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J.) Feith asked to find evidence of an Iraqi-Al Qaeda "connection" in order to better justify a U.S. invasion."

Case Decidedly Not Closed - Newsweek National News - MSNBC.com

These criticisms did not stop Vice President Dick Cheney, however, from telling the Rocky Mountain News on January 24 that The Weekly Standard article was the "best source of information" on collaboration between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda.

Hayes's book, like his 2003 "Case Closed" article, largely relies on the Feith memo, as well as on what Hayes describes as "open sources": unclassified government reports, court documents, and news reports. The Wall Street Journal's conservative editorial page wrote of the book on May 27: "In his new book, "The Connection," Stephen Hayes of The Weekly Standard puts together all of the many strands of intriguing evidence that the two did do business together. There's no single "smoking gun," but there sure is a lot of smoke."

Media Matters - Stephen Hayes: Conservatives' favorite authority on "The Connection"

Think Progress » Stephen Hayes Strikes Out (Again)

An attack on Stephen Hayes now? This is what you sound like:

Number 9.......Number 9.........Number 9........Number 9.........Number 9.........

I


Iraq and al-Qaeda Untied
Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report Dismisses Iraqi Ties to al-Qaeda
By Steve Schippert
Much is being disputed about the contents and conclusions asserted within the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report attempting to compare, in three major sections, prewar Iraq intelligence estimates with postwar Iraq findings regarding ‘Iraq’s WMD Capabilities,’ ‘Iraqi Links to al-Qaeda’ and ‘Regime Intent.’ While it is being currently touted in media reports with the air of a comprehensive and definitive assessment, it is decidedly neither. This is the introduction of a collaborative series of analytical reviews of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report titled, “Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism And How They Compare With Prewar Assessments.”

By the report’s own acknowledgement, there has yet to be produced a “‘fully researched, coordinated and approved position’ on the postwar reporting on the former regime’s links to al-Qa’ida” by the Intelligence Community with which to compare to prewar assessments. Furthermore, especially with regard to WMD capabilities and ‘Regime Intent,’ the incredibly thorough Iraqi Perspectives Project postwar study produced by United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, was not even considered with other postwar assessments.

Rather than cite such reports for its postwar input, the SSIC preferred to quote testimony in several instances from both Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz (among others). Both are in custody and on trial. As Tom Joscelyn rightly points out, these men—“all of whom have an obvious incentive to lie—are cited or quoted without caveats of any sort.”

Nor, apparently, did the Committee consider the prewar intelligence cited by Stephen Hayes in November, 2003. Hayes exposes in the referenced article many connections, not the least of which were multiple sources corroborating multiple Iraqi meetings with bin-Laden in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Iraqis – including the deputy director of the Iraqi Intelligence Services. Included in an October 2003 memo from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee was a clarifying note saying, “Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different sources, corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings between al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

This is seemingly dismissed and not included as noteworthy prewar intelligence for consideration, just as the Iraqi Perspectives Project was dismissed from consideration for postwar findings.

While early in the SSIC report it mentions the attempt to create an intelligence “baseline,” the conclusions are written in a language that purports them as definitive. In fact, Conclusion 9 on page 112 reads, “While document exploitation continues, additionalreviews of documents recovered in Iraq are unlikely to provide information that would contradict the Committee’s findings or conclusions.”

This is an ill advisedly bold statement, and notes Michael Tanji, who has been involved in the Iraqi document exploitation process, “[S]aying that you have a strong grasp on what was and wasn’t going on in Iraq based on an “initial review” is akin to saying that you don’t need to read the bible because you’ve memorized the ten commandments.”

This hardly scratches the surface of the report’s inadequate considerations, inconsistencies and, therefore, erroneous conclusions. There are a great many aspects of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report that must be swiftly addressed, in particular the data used and conclusions asserted regarding the connections between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and al-Qaeda.

It is imperative that the American public be presented with a more complete picture than the seemingly selective data points utilized by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report.

To this end, ThreatsWatch and Mark Eichenlaub of Regime of Terror are working together in order to provide an extensive analysis to the general public in a more easily digested format. This analysis will be produced and published as a series of focused examinations of the conclusions tendered by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee’s report as it pertains to the connections between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and al-Qaeda terrorists.

Originally Posted by Sparta

Nor, apparently, did the Committee consider the prewar intelligence cited by Stephen Hayes in November, 2003. Hayes exposes in the referenced article many connections, not the least of which were multiple sources corroborating multiple Iraqi meetings with bin-Laden in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Iraqis – including the deputy director of the Iraqi Intelligence Services. Included in an October 2003 memo from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee was a clarifying note saying, “Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different sources, corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings between al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

The Department of Defense issued a press release downplaying the memo's significance and undermining the conclusion reached by Hayes: "The classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaida, and it drew no conclusions."

DoD News: DoD Statement on News Reports of Al Qaeda and Iraq Connections

On November 18, 2003, The Washington Post's Pincus reported criticisms of Hayes's article and of the memo itself: W. Patrick Lang, former head of the Middle East section of the DIA said yesterday that the Standard article "is a listing of a mass of unconfirmed reports, many of which themselves indicate that the two groups continued to try to establish some sort of relationship. If they had such a productive relationship, why did they have to keep trying?"

CIA Seeks Probe of Iraq-Al Qaeda Memo Leak (washingtonpost.com)

By the report’s own acknowledgement, there has yet to be produced a “‘fully researched, coordinated and approved position’ on the postwar reporting on the former regime’s links to al-Qa’ida” by the Intelligence Community with which to compare to prewar assessments. Furthermore, especially with regard to WMD capabilities and ‘Regime Intent,’ the incredibly thorough Iraqi Perspectives Project postwar study produced by United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, was not even considered with other postwar assessments.

Rather than cite such reports for its postwar input, the SSIC preferred to quote testimony in several instances from both Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz (among others). Both are in custody and on trial. As Tom Joscelyn rightly points out, these men—“all of whom have an obvious incentive to lie—are cited or quoted without caveats of any sort.”

Originally Posted by Sparta

By the report’s own acknowledgement, there has yet to be produced a “‘fully researched, coordinated and approved position’ on the postwar reporting on the former regime’s links to al-Qa’ida” by the Intelligence Community with which to compare to prewar assessments. Furthermore, especially with regard to WMD capabilities and ‘Regime Intent,’ the incredibly thorough Iraqi Perspectives Project postwar study produced by United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, was not even considered with other postwar assessments.

Rather than cite such reports for its postwar input, the SSIC preferred to quote testimony in several instances from both Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz (among others). Both are in custody and on trial. As Tom Joscelyn rightly points out, these men—“all of whom have an obvious incentive to lie—are cited or quoted without caveats of any sort.”

I assume this is your source?

Iraq and al-Qaeda Untied (Regime of Terror)

Here's NEW info:

Senate: Saddam saw al-Qaida as threat

By JIM ABRAMS, Associated Press Writer

Fri Sep 8, 2006

Saddam Hussein regarded al-Qaida as a threat rather than a possible ally, a Senate report says, contradicting assertions President Bush has used to build support for the war in Iraq.

Released Friday, the report discloses for the first time an October 2005 CIA assessment that before the war, Saddam's government "did not have a relationship, harbor or turn a blind eye toward" al-Qaida operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or his associates.

Saddam told U.S. officials after his capture that he had not cooperated with Osama bin Laden even though he acknowledged that officials in his government had met with the al-Qaida leader, according to FBI summaries cited in the Senate report.

"Saddam only expressed negative sentiments about bin Laden," Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi leader's top aide, told the FBI.

As recently as an Aug. 21 news conference, Bush said people should "imagine a world in which you had Saddam Hussein" with the capacity to make weapons of mass destruction and "who had relations with Zarqawi."

Democrats contended that the administration continues to use faulty intelligence, including assertions of a link between Saddam's government and the recently killed al-Zarqawi, to justify the war in Iraq.

According to the report, postwar findings indicate that Saddam "was distrustful of al-Qaida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime."

It said al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad from May until late November 2002. But "postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi."
In June 2004, Bush defended Vice President Dick Cheney's assertion that Saddam had "long-established ties" with al-Qaida. "Zarqawi is the best evidence of connection to al-Qaida affiliates and al-Qaida," the president said.

The report concludes that postwar findings do not support a 2002 intelligence report that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, possessed biological weapons or had ever developed mobile facilities for producing biological warfare agents.

"The report is a devastating indictment of the Bush-Cheney administration's unrelenting, misleading and deceptive attempts to convince the American people that Saddam Hussein was linked with al-Qaida," said Sen. Carl Levin (news, bio, voting record), D-Mich., a member of the committee.
Levin and Sen. Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, the top Democrat on the panel, said Tenet told the committee last July that in 2002 he had complied with an administration request "to say something about not being inconsistent with what the president had said" about the Saddam-terrorist link.

They said that on Oct. 7, 2002, the same day Bush gave a speech speaking of such a link, the CIA had sent a declassified letter to the committee saying it would be an "extreme step" for Saddam to assist Islamist terrorists in attacking the United States.

They said Tenet acknowledged to the committee that subsequently issuing a statement that there was no inconsistency between the president's speech and the CIA viewpoint was "the wrong thing to do."

The panel report is Phase II of an analysis of prewar intelligence on Iraq. The first phase, issued in July 2004, focused on the CIA's failings in its estimates of Iraq's weapons program.

The second phase had been delayed as Republicans and Democrats fought over what information should be declassified and how far the committee should delve into the question of whether policymakers may have manipulated intelligence to make the case for war.

Print Story: Senate: Saddam saw al-Qaida as threat on Yahoo! News

Dr. Knuckles applauds both gladiators and sneaks off to get another pop-corn.

keep it up lads... great thread. Sorry, I can't contribute.. i'm out of my league here.

Of course that's my source, the article said so.
Your posts are an unfinished product.
Have a nice day.

Originally Posted by Sparta

An attack on Stephen Hayes now?

Hayes isn't a credible source because his "proof" has been debunked. For instance, he claimed that Ahmad Hikmat Shakir Azzawi was under Iraqi intelligence control. His allegation was debunked by U.S. intelligence officials and the 9/11 Commission. No such tie was indicated in the report by the 9/11 Commission.

Hayes also obtained a memo, which (according to him) "proves" that Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligent agent in Prague. However, the 9/11 Commission debunked the claim. The Commission stated that: "We do not believe that such a meeting occurred." The report by the 9/11 Commission said that Atta was in Virginia on April 4 (evidenced by video that shows him withdrawing $8,000 from an ATM) and he was in Florida by April 11 if not before.

If you notice the sources posted by mr Pott you will see that all are left leaning sources who of course have an agenda here.

As i pointed out before the idea that an Iraq/ 9/11 connection needs be made is a red herring. Despite the fact that I know from personal experience that Iraq /AQ connections are numerous and well documented. (I was one of those who was involved in my work for the government) it remains a sidebar to the fact that congress gave the president carte blanc authority to pursue terrorists and terror supporting governments. I suggest that not even Mr. Pott would attempt to claim that Iraq was not a terror supporting and sponsoring nation. So this demand that 9/11 and saddam be connected is an attempt to divert the real question....Was AQ involved in Iraq before we invaded? The answer is irrefutable. Most of the top leadership that escaped Afghanistan went either to Pakistan or Iraq....and took their billions of dollars with them.
despite the Washington bleep, and Mr. Potts best efforts the facts remain that Saddam and AQ were bed fellows for more than a decade prior to 9/11.

Now I realize that my personal experience has no credibility to those who do not know me. After all I could be making it up , but take it for what it is worth. I was involved for more than 30 years in the intelligence business, and one of my final assignments was the middle east. We had "tags" on many of the terrorists orginizations, and knew who they talked to and who they supported. The fact that some would question these obvious connections speaks volumns about their personal stake and motivation. To claim that they are seeking truth is absurd.
This is about obfuscation of the truth...the question that should be asked is what are the obfuscators motivations.

Originally Posted by LC

If you notice the sources posted by mr Pott you will see that all are left leaning sources who of course have an agenda here.

As i pointed out before the idea that an Iraq/ 9/11 connection needs be made is a red herring. Despite the fact that I know from personal experience that Iraq /AQ connections are numerous and well documented. (I was one of those who was involved in my work for the government) it remains a sidebar to the fact that congress gave the president carte blanc authority to pursue terrorists and terror supporting governments. I suggest that not even Mr. Pott would attempt to claim that Iraq was not a terror supporting and sponsoring nation. So this demand that 9/11 and saddam be connected is an attempt to divert the real question....Was AQ involved in Iraq before we invaded? The answer is irrefutable. Most of the top leadership that escaped Afghanistan went either to Pakistan or Iraq....and took their billions of dollars with them.
despite the Washington bleep, and Mr. Potts best efforts the facts remain that Saddam and AQ were bed fellows for more than a decade prior to 9/11.

Now I realize that my personal experience has no credibility to those who do not know me. After all I could be making it up , but take it for what it is worth. I was involved for more than 30 years in the intelligence business, and one of my final assignments was the middle east. We had "tags" on many of the terrorists orginizations, and knew who they talked to and who they supported. The fact that some would question these obvious connections speaks volumns about their personal stake and motivation. To claim that they are seeking truth is absurd.
This is about obfuscation of the truth...the question that should be asked is what are the obfuscators motivations.

Then you must get TOP TOP Secret info that the pentagon isn't permitted to see? Your thoughts and beliefs don't necessarily contribute to fact or truth, nor do mine. ~Inky